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ABSTRACT      The use of simulations in higher education teaching is burgeoning 
in political science curricula, particularly in international relations and European 
Union studies. This article contends that most simulations suffer from complexity 
bias and put too much emphasis on substantive knowledge. Drawing on the 
author’s experience, two ideal types of simulations are developed. ‘Complex’ 
simulations focusing on negotiating content and ‘simple’ simulations focusing on 
negotiating dynamics. It is argued that the transmission of transferable skills is 
facilitated by multiple repetitions of similar negotiating contexts within the same 
module. This suggests that instructors face a trade-off between teaching 
transferable skills and substantive knowledge and should locate their simulations at 
either end of this continuum. Where students are not native speakers, not yet 
familiar with specialised terminology, or simply unversed in negotiating dynamics 
there is a particularly strong argument to make for carrying out simple simulations 
first, followed by complex simulations later in the curriculum. Finally, 
opportunities for collaborative research are highlighted. Gathering and pooling data 
from simple simulations bridges pedagogy and research at minimal additional cost. 
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‘It is frequent repetition that produces a natural tendency’ (Aristotle 2014: 113) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
‘The pressure is too much for me! I don’t know what to do’, Hans exclaims. I can feel his 
eyes turning to me for support but I continue to stare at the floor in order not to interfere with 
the experiment. Hans is an undergraduate BA student in his final year taking part in my 
simulation of EU enlargement negotiations. He is representing Germany and finds himself in 
a bitter dispute with France. Hans has conceded too much too early in the negotiations and has 
already reached his reservation point (RP). Ceding anything more at this stage risks non-
ratification of the final agreement back home. In fact, Hans has already revealed this 
information publicly – but France considers it a deceitful bargaining strategy. The Presidency 
intervenes repeatedly in the final minutes, breaking into numerous ‘confessional’ meetings to 
talk to both parties bilaterally and, back in plenary, turning up the heat by calling on Germany 
and France not to risk a breakdown of the negotiations after seventy minutes of settling on all 
other outstanding points. Time on the countdown projected on the wall behind the Presidency 
is unrelentingly running out. It is now ten seconds before I will break off the simulation and 
declare it a failure, as I did in the first simulation. France is showing no signs of giving in. 
Hans feels forced to resolve the impasse. He takes a step towards France, taking him slightly 
beyond his RP but allowing the negotiations to end. Everyone is relieved. In the debriefing 
stage I point out to Hans that he must not reach his RP before trade-offs get into full swing. 
He never made that mistake again. 
This opening paragraph is taken from one of my simulation sessions on EU 
enlargement. In total, we have simulated four enlargement rounds within the same module 
and the information provided to students was rather light on substance, which leads me to 
describe this class of simulations as ‘simple’ and to contrast them with ‘complex’ simulations 
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that make a heavier substantive commitment. This article’s contribution to the literature is 
threefold. First, I argue that a trade-off between ‘teaching substantive knowledge’ (negotiating 
content) and ‘teaching transferable skills’ (negotiating dynamics) exists and that, ideally, 
instructors should place their simulations at either end of this continuum for modules not to 
become too dense informationally. Second, this contribution will stress the importance of 
repetition, which is the central pedagogical principle of skills acquisition. A succession of 
similar negotiation contexts helps students develop transferable skills better than one content-
laden simulation extending over the whole term. Finally, I highlight the potential of using 
simple simulation data for theory-testing research due to their high replicability. 
The data for this article has been gathered from various sources. First, the author 
taught two identical simulations on EU enlargement at two German universities in 2013. 
These simulations were designed autonomously by the author with a high degree of 
abstraction and focused on numerical values (‘simple’ simulations). He also benefited from a 
term-long negotiations course with numerical variables at Tulane University as an 
undergraduate student. Second, the author participated in an award-winning simulation on the 
EU services directive at the University of Salzburg as an undergraduate. This simulation 
focused on substantive outcomes and procedural aspects of decision-making processes in the 
EU over the whole cycle of the co-decision procedure with the need to draft texts (‘complex’ 
simulations). He also participated in a week-long Model United Nations (MUN) in Vienna, 
which fell more into this second category. Third, the author designed and supervised 
simulations on the EU multiannual financial framework (MFF) at the Riga Graduate School 
of Law. He furthermore participated in simulations of the European Council at the European 
Summer School of the École Nationale Supérieure d’Arts et Métiers (Cluny campus) and later 
co-organised five. These simulations fall between the first two categories, beginning with an 
introduction to essential bargaining concepts followed by a more complex decision-making 
context. These experiences – both as participant and instructor and ranging from twenty to 
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over one hundred students – allow me to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of different 
simulation styles. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section two reviews the use of 
simulations in political science and looks at concrete examples from European studies. 
Section three develops ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ simulations as two opposing ideal types. The 
fourth section highlights the different learning objectives of these two classes of simulations 
and stresses the importance of repetition. Section five charts the potential of future 
collaboration facilitated by simple simulations. Finally, section six provides a conclusion that 
sets out the main contribution and argument of the article. 
 
SIMULATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE CURRICULA 
Simulations have been elegantly defined by Usherwood as a ‘recreation of a real-world 
situation, designed to explore key [sic] elements of that situation’ (2014: 2). They go back to 
the 1920s and the emergence of International Relations (IR) as a sub-discipline of politics, 
when Model League of Nations became popularised across the Unites States (US) (Kuehl and 
Dunn, 1997: 70–1). Simulations of the European Union (EU) reach back to the 1980s and 
were, again, pioneered at US universities (Zeff, 2003: 266). Although no comprehensive 
figures on the use of simulations in higher education institutions exist, they seem on the rise 
particularly in IR (Archer and Miller, 2011). In Europe the trend towards active forms of 
learning, and thus from ‘the sage on the stage to the guide on the side’ (King, 1993), is set to 
continue with the Bologna process (Guasti et al, 2015; Lightfoot and Maurer, 2014). Even if 
establishing a clear link between motivational levels and learning success can be difficult 
(Raymond, 2010; Raymond and Usherwood, 2013), simulations are widely perceived as 
increasing students’ level of motivation and function as ‘motivational hooks’ to encourage 
engagement with the subject (Freitas, 2006: 350; Shellman and Turan, 2006). In the wake of 
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benchmarking tools such as the Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) in the United 
Kingdom (UK) or the Studienqualitätsmonitor (SQM) in Germany, teaching quality and 
student satisfaction rates are likely to rise in importance in the future and will require more 
attention from academics. 
In keeping with the major thrust of this article, I will briefly review here a selection of 
simulations predicated on the EU focusing on their level of complexity. EU simulations 
include Kaunert who met students weekly for ‘plenary sessions’ of the Council of Ministers 
with a ‘range of official documents’ uploaded on Blackboard (2009: 259, 262). Zeff simulates 
the European Council, aiming for ‘realistic’ relationships among actors and highlighting the 
‘complexities of the EU’s institutions’ (2003: 267). Van Dyke et al. ran three-day simulations 
across fifteen US colleges on topics warranting ‘extensive study’ and susceptible to 
‘debateable’ (2000: 149) resolutions. Switky organised a short single-class session on voting 
rules in the Council where students were charged with preparing their country’s preferences 
using the Internet or by contacting official EU representatives (2004: 44). Galatas (2006) also 
charged students with drafting resolutions on various issues followed by an in-class 
simulation of the Council with amendments passed by qualified majority voting (QMV) or 
unanimity. Brunazzo and Settembri (2015) developed a simulation of the European Citizens’ 
Initiative where students acquire a detailed understanding of underlying issues. Elias (2014) 
carried out a simulation of the Czech Presidency in the Council, focusing on substantive 
knowledge. Both Bobot and Goergen (2010) and Fink (2015) conducted simulations of the 
EU chocolate directive, going through a full co-decision procedure. While this implies 
multiple repetitions of the same directive, the institutional context changes with every stage. 
While this review should not be interpreted as meaning that simulations are necessarily 
always ‘complex’, in European Studies they mostly seem to be. The remainder of this article 
will tease out some of the implications of this complexity bias. 
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In spite of the availability of guidelines (e.g., Asal and Blake, 2006; Glazier, 2011; 
Smith and Boyer, 1996) simulations can be painstaking to prepare. There are numerous 
examples of simulations in a variety of different contexts, which is both a blessing and a 
curse. While adding to the initially high start-up costs by having to familiarise oneself with 
this literature, the inspiration one can take from it is remarkable (cf. Clapper, 2015: 132). 
Nevertheless, the first time a lecturer adapts a simulation to her own research, learning 
objectives need to be identified, briefing and background material drafted, a procedure for the 
actual simulation selected and the form of assessment, evaluation and debriefing chosen. The 
first decision, however, should concern just how complex the simulation should eventually 
become. Most scholars’ intuition (as complex and real as possible!) may not necessarily be 
the right choice. 
 
THE TWO POLES OF THE SIMPLICITY–COMPLEXITY CONTINUUM 
Simulations can be arranged on a continuum ranging from simplicity to complexity. 
Generally, simulations consist of four building blocks: first, clear educational objectives; 
second, background information and briefing material; third, some procedure that needs to be 
followed during the simulation; and, fourth, a debriefing period dedicated to reflection 
(Lantis, 2000: 129; Usherwood, 2014).1 These building blocks apply invariably to all 
simulations. But, depending on where the simulation is placed on the continuum of 
complexity, they can become rather different in practical terms (for a similar approach 
concerning all active learning techniques, see Bonwell and Sutherland, 1996; and focusing on 
learning objectives in EU simulations, see Raiser et al, 2015).  
                                                 
1 Assessment and student grading are a potential fifth block. This aspect is, however, not included explicitly in 
my typology since it is unclear how this would differ systematically across simple and complex simulations. 
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In what follows I develop two ideal types of simulations to illustrate this point. It 
should be pointed out that ideal types are extreme points on a continuum and therefore actual 
cases are rare or even non-existent (Goertz, 2008: 105). Therefore I only make sparse 
reference to concrete simulations in this section. Moreover, and in line with the definition 
provided above, simulations, even when complex, are always reductions of reality focusing on 
key elements of some event. At the other end, simple political science simulations exhibit 
some degree of complexity by being embedded in a specific historical and/or procedural 
context and assigning multiple roles. Hence, ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ are relative rather than 
absolute terms.2 Nevertheless, ideal types are useful for building typologies and defining 
essential features against which real cases can be measured (della Porta, 2008: 206). Above 
and beyond, they allow us to illustrate effects affected by fundamental choices of game 
design. Table 1 summarises my argument. Before discussing learning objectives, repetition 
and replicability, this section will deal with the remaining dimensions first. 
 
Table 1: Simple and complex simulations juxtaposed 
  Simple simulations Complex simulations 
Focus Dynamics Content 
Briefing material Lecturer-driven Student-driven 
Simulation procedure Informal (e.g., consensus) Formal (e.g., QMV) 
Negotiating variables Numerical Text-based 
Required language proficiency Low High 
Debriefing Intensive Extensive 
Learning objective Transferable skills Substantive knowledge 
Repetition Multiple None 
Replicability High Low 
Source: Author’s own table. 
 
                                                 
2 I owe this point to an anonymous referee. 
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On the one end are ‘complex’ (or substantive) simulations, which approximate the fascinating 
decision-making dynamics underpinning contemporary international negotiations. In keeping 
with the literature review presented above, the bulk of simulations encountered in higher 
education today seem rather complex. Substantive simulations are suitable for lecturers if they 
wish to teach students the intricacy of political decisions and the varying interests that need to 
be aggregated in the process of finding consensus. Briefing material is provided by lecturers, 
but significant background information needs to be prepared autonomously by students as 
well (e.g., in the form of position papers). This helps to unburden lecturers in the preparatory 
stages and prepares students to engage in substantive discussions. The simulation itself 
typically follows real-life rules of procedure, for example with the option to raise different 
motions in accordance with a pre-set modus operandi or detailed rules for a weighted voting 
procedure. Negotiations themselves focus on variables that are text-based, with participants 
tasked to find formulations having the backing of a qualified majority of all delegations.  
This lends itself to value-creating (Lax and Sebenius, 1986), integrative (Walton and 
McKersie, 1965), problem-solving or simply ‘soft’ bargaining techniques (Dür and Mateo, 
2010a; Hopmann, 1974) through communicative action (Niemann, 2004; Risse, 2000), as 
students have greater scope to find solutions. But it can be seriously hampered where 
simulations are not in the students’ native language. Even for native speakers, language can 
prove a considerable obstacle if many technical terms are employed. Text-based simulations 
require participants to be sensitive to subtle nuances in the drafting language. Since 
negotiations in the EU take place among non-native speakers this can form one insight in 
itself. But if language proficiency differs widely among participants this can quickly turn into 
a source of frustration for everyone.  
Debriefing constitutes another fundamental step in simulations as it is here that the 
simulation experience turns into learning and is incorporated by students (Crookall, 2010: 
907–10). In general terms, it can be defined as ‘a process in which people who have had an 
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experience are led through a purposive discussion of that experience’ (Lederman, 1992: 146). 
The nature of debriefing differs vastly across complex and simple simulations. In complex 
simulations debriefing is extensive and can deal with various points. For example, factual 
errors accumulating in the simulation – be they substantive or procedural – as far as they are 
not cleared as the simulation is ongoing (which interferes with the simulation process) need to 
be pointed out in its aftermath. Of course, the core bargaining dimension of simulations can 
also be touched upon at this stage, which is consistent with labelling them as ‘extensive’. But 
as time overall is limited, dealing with points of substance and procedure inevitably leaves 
less scope for analysing the bargaining dynamics. This is a crucial point that we shall come 
back to in the next section. 
At the other end of the continuum are ‘simple’ (or dynamic) simulations. Rather than 
detailing the decision-making environment, procedurally and substantively, these simulations 
have as their core objective highlighting the dynamics of negotiations. Students are typically 
not charged with drafting their own positions before the simulation but are given all the 
necessary information, including payoffs or RPs. In fact, in my simple simulations I explicitly 
discourage students from looking up information beforehand to prevent them from being 
influenced by real-world outcomes. The briefing material sets out a plausible story of issues to 
be negotiated but keeps it short and simple so as not to detract from the negotiations. 
Simulation variables are typically numerical values like prices, subsidies, quotas or transition 
periods. These variables can be set more or less freely, which enables lecturers to manipulate 
the zone of possible agreement (ZOPA). It is important that zones vary from simulation to 
simulation and students should never have even a rough indication of their outlines.  
Students can be sure that a ZOPA always exists and agreements can, in principle, 
always be struck. The simulation procedure is very informal and in the end the agreement of 
all parties is needed, which means students do not have to familiarise themselves with the 
details of QMV. This sets the stage for very vibrant simulations in which one student’s gain is 
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another student’s loss. While both integrative, value-creating and distributive, value-claiming 
negotiations occur in real life, the latter has the advantage of allowing exact statements about 
how well students have performed and helps to pinpoint mistakes by those underperforming 
(e.g., opening bid too low, too frequent concessions, going beyond one’s RP). This facilitates 
debriefing. Although using simulation outcomes as a basis for grading is tricky, the ability to 
formulate precise statements about students’ in-simulation performance unleashes their full 
pedagogic potential. Language proficiency is also less of an issue since a basic level suffices 
to survive in most situations. In contrast to complex simulations, debriefing is intensive and 
focuses on how simulations unfolded and how the varying rates of success among students 
can be explained.  
 
PICKING SIDES FOR AN ENCORE 
The most fundamental difference between simple and complex simulations can be found with 
regard to the learning objective. Simple simulations focus on transferable skills, such as the 
ability to prevail in a distributive zero-sum negotiating setting, whereas complex simulations 
are best placed to share substantive knowledge. Undeniably, complex simulations also do 
train students in a number of transferable skills, such as thorough preparation for important 
meetings, elaboration of their own positions, reacting quickly to the stance of others and 
public speaking. However, these skills are equally trainable in simple simulations. The unique 
point of complex simulations really is the better retention of substantive knowledge. Once 
students have worked through the institutional mechanics of an organisation applied to a case 
first hand, the experience is bound to be more memorable than merely reading about it. But 
chunks of that substantive knowledge are not transferable to other situations. For example, the 
detailed understanding of the rules of procedure of any given body or the content of particular 
EU directives bring students limited benefits if they do not find employment in areas where 
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they profit from that insight (on the connection of skills and employability, see Maurer and 
Mawdsley, 2014).3 
Another central element in all simulations is time, which leads to the value of 
repetition. Based on the insight gained from negotiation simulations, I consider credible 
deadlines the single most important determinant of bringing negotiations to a successful 
close.4 Only if participants know that simulations run seventy minutes – and seventy minutes 
only – can the sort of ‘pressure’ described in the opening paragraph build up. In a ninety-
minute block per session this leaves twenty minutes for debriefing, which suffices considering 
this pattern is repeated four times.5 In the first simulation I do not yet project a giant 
countdown on the wall behind the Presidency. The first simulation failing to produce 
agreement has explanatory value in itself (Sasley, 2010) and the sense of frustration 
experienced by the group is a prerequisite for the weight on participants’ shoulders felt in 
subsequent negotiations. Since the simulation is repeated four times, students have every 
opportunity to improve on their performance. By the time of the third simulation I am always 
impressed with students’ steep learning curve. After a few negotiating sessions the degree of 
professionalisation attained is remarkable. Repetition truly is the source of natural tendency. 
With this I come to the trade-off between teaching different sorts of skills. Although 
we all want our students to take away as much as possible, there is a natural limit to how 
much one can learn in any one module. In fact, ‘information overload’ verifiably has a 
detrimental effect on student learning through lower retention rates (e.g., Aiken et al, 1975; 
                                                 
3 Notwithstanding more civic benefits such as learning how political decisions are crafted (see Curtis 2012: 79). 
4 Note that ‘successful’ should not necessarily be equated with ‘good’. While time pressures force negotiators 
into decisions, these can be sub-optimal or even unviable in the long term (Carnevale and Lawler 1986). In 
simulations long-term effects of decisions need not concern us. 
5 If there are four simulations in one module, this cumulatively amounts to almost a full session dedicated 
entirely to feedback. 
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Russell et al, 1984). The basic intuition behind these findings is easy to grasp. As our brains 
have a limited capacity to process new information, whenever they are faced with too much 
input details are wiped out until the workload becomes manageable. Over ambition is, 
perhaps, the most frequent mistake committed by junior lecturers who want to teach 
negotiation skills and substantive knowledge at the same time. Given that students’ capacity 
to absorb information is limited, the trade-off between objectives is self-evident. In a benign 
interpretation one could argue that every student simply picks the skills set that they are most 
interested in. A more disconcerting reading would hold that the learning outcomes become 
random. 
For lecturers who have already prepared numerous simulations this may all too easily 
be forgotten. But seemingly simple information, such as the different roles of EU institutions 
or procedural rules, were difficult to grasp for us at the beginning, too. In the same vein, basic 
bargaining concepts like RP, ZOPA or BATNA may be trivial for us today. But when we 
were first initiated into them their power to conceptually grasp different negotiating settings 
and shape our behaviour did not reveal itself to us instantly. Of these two pools of information 
the first one may be larger. International organisations like the EU are today complex 
institutions with formal and informal decision-making procedures operating in an intricate 
web of multiple stakeholders with different, usually conflicting, interests. But the negotiation 
literature is also sophisticated and far from trivial (e.g., Dür et al, 2010; Odell, 2000; Odell, 
2010; Raiffa, 1982). Hence the admonition put forth in this article that teaching substantive 
knowledge and transferable skills simultaneously may be counterproductive. Lecturers are 
well advised to pick either of the two sides and should carefully consider if simple simulations 




THE UNTAPPED RESEARCH POTENTIAL 
Simple simulations have another major advantage: replicability. In economics – which has 
frequently foreshadowed developments in political science – a whole branch has grown out of 
experiments with undergraduate students. Vernon L. Smith received the Nobel Prize ‘for 
having established laboratory experiments as a tool in empirical economic analysis’ (The 
Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 2002). In the humanities college-based experiments 
quickly rose to prominence, too, even if drawing general conclusions from student 
populations was identified as problematic (Sears, 1986). Although in political science the 
adoption of experiments was initially considered practically and ethically unattainable 
(Lijphart, 1971: 683–4) and generalising findings to the elite-driven processes with which 
political scientists are typically concerned proves equally problematic (Mintz et al, 2006), 
experiments have in the meantime been firmly included in our methodological toolbox (e.g., 
Druckman et al, 2006; Druckman et al, 2011; Margetts and Stoker, 2010; McDermott, 2002). 
Though far from flawless, the omission of experimental methods as a valid research strategy 
to test political science hypotheses imposes unwarranted limitations on our field’s rate of 
development.  
Simulations are not proper experiments because participants are not assigned 
randomly and control groups are difficult to establish. But every simulation has the potential 
to become a quasi-experiment (Asal et al, 2013; McBurney and White, 2009: 345–8), thus 
blurring the lines between research and pedagogy. The argument that these quasi-experiments 
can help to evaluate learning outcomes and – in a European context – identity formation has 
already been made (Guasti et al, 2015; Rünz, 2015). But almost any storyline can be broken 
down into a number of issues that lend themselves to numerical negotiations with a clearly 
definable ZOPA. This gives these quasi-experiments a yet untapped potential to help our 
cumulative understanding of bargaining outcomes. Ideally, participants record their opening 
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bids and concessions through an online system with which to keep track of bargaining moves 
with surgical precision. But all other data collection strategies are in principle equally 
available (e.g., surveys, interviews, participant observation) and can ideally be triangulated. 
Simulations failing to record results in a systematic fashion are not realising their full 
potential. 
In contrast to complex simulations with text-based variables, simple simulations can 
be perfectly manipulated and outcomes precisely measured. Each numerical negotiating 
variable can be defined by the area around its median. If students negotiate a financial 
envelope, such as the EU’s MFF, and state A as net contributor has been given a RP of 1.1 
trillion Euros (or less) and state B as net beneficiary one of 0.9 trillion Euros (or more), the 
median is 1 trillion and the ZOPA is 0.2 trillion Euros. This means that the ZOPA extends 10 
per cent around the median.6 Irrespective of the narrative offered to students to explain what 
this variable represents, it can be compared to variables in all simulations where the ZOPA 
exhibits the same properties. Similarly, the success of state A and state B in the negotiations 
can be accurately measured. If the simulation ends with 1.1 trillion, state B’s success rate is 
100 per cent, whereas with 0.9 trillion state A’s victory would be total. If the outcome settles 
right on the median both states share a 50 per cent rate of success.7 
With the dependent variable operationalised a number of independent variables 
hypothesised to influence negotiation outcomes can be tested. From a gender perspective, it 
would be interesting to see if male students outperform female students – or if negotiations 
                                                 
6 This generally computes as the median minus the difference of median and ZOPA, all divided by two. 
7 Generally, one minus: the student’s distance from the RP, over the ZOPA divided by one hundred. Where, as in 
the example of the opening paragraph, one student manages to get past another’s RP the success rate should 
nevertheless be defined as 100 and zero per cent, respectively. Where students negotiate more than one variable 
all outcomes could be aggregated to arrive at a single measure of success. 
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among exclusively female students give rise to more equitable agreements closer to the 
median. This could help explain why today, with male negotiators dominating in this area of 
public service, international negotiations appear ever so acrimonious. Culturally, it is 
worthwhile to investigate if bargaining outcomes can be explained by students coming from 
collectivist or individualist cultures (Dür and Mateo, 2010b: 686). Universities across Europe 
are in a special position here because of the diversity of the student population owing to the 
popularity of exchange programs like ERASMUS. 
Let me elaborate on another important practical implication of this approach. In order 
to use the gathered data for further analysis one needs clear student properties concerning the 
hypothesis one is aspiring to test. For example, if state A is represented by one student from a 
collectivist and another from an individualist culture, the outcome of the simulation could not 
give us insight into how cultural characteristics impact international negotiations. Therefore 
students will preferably not negotiate in teams,8 as is often the case, or the process of team-
building will need to be more actively managed by lecturers. Crucially, this problem is 
mitigated if we assume that eventually data from hundreds of simulations will become 
available. To stick to the example, even if the two students representing state A show 
conflicting properties concerning their cultural backgrounds, they may still both be female or 
converge on some other variable of interest and could provide added value for addressing 
other questions. 
                                                 
8 Some students could, for example, be tasked to acts as observers in the simulation/quasi-experiment, perhaps 
even charged to focus on other observable implications of interest (e.g., counting soft or hard bargaining 
strategies like ‘threats’ or ‘compromise proposals’, respectively). This also alleviates the problem of lecturers 
being unable to be in several locations at the same time when negotiations break into a more informal mode and 
occur in various smaller groups.   
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Collecting data over multiple replications of comparable simulations holds the promise 
of refining our understanding of what drives negotiating success (e.g., Fink, 2015) which is 
part and parcel of the international politics of interdependence encountered today. Moreover, 
establishing collaboration among lecturers interested in simulations could help overcome the 
(often prohibitively) high start-up costs for simulations. Although lecturers increasingly use 
simulations in the classroom and report about them in scholarly journals, the original game 
designs are still not generally made available for replication.9 By sharing and refining a pool 
of simple simulations their comparability, robustness and replicability can be increased and 
the data generated can be accumulated for additional scientific gain. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Let me end by noting that simple simulations do not make for one-sided or ‘easy’ modules. In 
Germany modules consist of around thirteen sessions per term of ninety minutes each. 
Subtracting three introductory sessions (one general, one on negotiating concepts, and another 
on EU enlargement), four sessions for actual simulations and one closing session with 
feedback and a final debate (e.g., on the final frontiers of the EU), leaves five substantive 
sessions for complementary material. These can be filled empirically by covering the 
historical context and state of the EU at the time of enlargement rounds (e.g., following 
Dinan, 2010) or, more theoretically, with major theories of European integration. Wiener and 
Diez (2009) have assembled an excellent edited volume on the strengths and weaknesses of 
                                                 
9 Sharing game designs publicly is problematic since students could look up the confidential instructions of 
others by downloading the journal article. Therefore, a closed electronic system open only to instructors after 





different theoretical approaches resorting to the common example of EU enlargement. This 
complementary part in the module also determined most of the students’ final grades. The 
feedback I received at the end of the term was overwhelming. Combining simple simulations 
with substantive sessions that are clearly separated may be one strategy to combine 
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